---
title: Your login page is under constant attack. A sane lockout policy
description: Password-guessing bots hit every WordPress login, all day. How the attacks work, what a sensible lockout policy looks like, and the mistakes that lock out real people.
url: https://ironhelmsuite.com/blog/login-attacks-lockout-policy/
---

# Your login page is under constant attack. A sane lockout policy

Password-guessing bots hit every WordPress login, all day. How the attacks work, what a sensible lockout policy looks like, and the mistakes that lock out real people.

Published 2026-06-03 in Security.

Put a new WordPress site online and, within days, its login page will start receiving guesses. Nobody chose your site. Bots work through lists of domains and try the same few usernames and a long list of leaked passwords, hoping for a match. Out of the box, WordPress lets them try forever.

You cannot stop the knocking. You can make it pointless.

## How the guessing actually works

**Credential stuffing** uses username and password pairs leaked from other sites. It works because people reuse passwords. OWASP lists it as one of the most common attacks against any login form.

**Brute force** tries common passwords against likely usernames: `admin`, the site's name, or names found on the site itself. WordPress helps attackers here more than it should: author archives and the public REST API can reveal usernames, and the default error message says whether a username exists.

**XML-RPC amplification** is the old WordPress-specific trick. Sucuri documented attacks in 2015 that used the `system.multicall` method of `xmlrpc.php` to try hundreds of passwords in a single HTTP request, slipping past tools that only counted requests. If nothing on your site uses XML-RPC (the Jetpack plugin and some old mobile apps did), turn it off.

## What a sensible lockout policy looks like

NIST's digital identity guidelines require login systems to limit failed attempts; the 2017 edition set a ceiling of 100 consecutive failures per account. That is a maximum, not a target. For a WordPress site, a practical policy is:

- **A handful of failures, then a pause.** Five failed attempts within fifteen minutes from the same address, then a pause of fifteen to thirty minutes. Real people rarely fail five times; bots fail thousands of times.
- **Longer pauses for repeat offenders.** An address that gets paused again and again in a day can wait for hours.
- **Instant pause for obvious usernames.** If nobody on your site is called `admin` or `administrator`, anyone trying those names is not a customer.
- **One error message for everything.** "That username and password do not match" for both cases, so the form stops confirming which usernames exist. OWASP recommends exactly this.
- **An allow list for your own office**, so a colleague's typo does not lock out the whole team behind one shared IP address.

## The mistakes that lock out real people

- **Locking the account instead of the address.** If five bad guesses lock the *account*, an attacker can lock your administrator out on purpose, forever. Pause the source, not the person.
- **No way back in.** A lockout needs an escape route: an unlock link by email, or a command an administrator can run on the server.
- **Silent lockouts.** If a lockout happens, someone should know. Hearing about a burst of lockouts on the account named after your client is useful information.

## Should you hide the login page?

Moving `wp-login.php` to a private address cuts the noise in your logs dramatically and saves server work. It is not security on its own: a determined attacker can often find the new address, and the real protection is still strong passwords, two-step login and rate limits. We treat a private login address as a comfort feature, not a wall.

## In Ironhelm

Login protection pauses addresses after a number of failures you choose, pauses repeat offenders for longer, pauses straight away on usernames you list, keeps one error message for every failure, never locks out addresses you trust, and can alert you about every lockout. A private login address is optional. Hardening switches off XML-RPC when nothing on the site needs it, and `wp ironhelm unlock` gets anyone back in from the command line.

## Sources

- OWASP, [Credential Stuffing Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Credential_Stuffing_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html)
- OWASP, [Authentication Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Authentication_Cheat_Sheet.html) (authentication and error messages)
- Sucuri, [Brute Force Amplification Attacks Against WordPress XMLRPC](https://blog.sucuri.net/2015/10/brute-force-amplification-attacks-against-wordpress-xmlrpc.html) (October 2015)
- NIST, [SP 800-63B: Authentication and Lifecycle Management, section 5.2.2 Rate Limiting](https://pages.nist.gov/800-63-3/sp800-63b.html) (2017 edition)
